



NEWSLETTER

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Tactical Operations Center (TOC)



**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
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
Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

PREFACE

Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations is an area where many units at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) experience problems. Some common problems include:

- √ **Poor understanding and implementation of basic TOC functions.**
- √ **Ineffective utilization of TOC personnel (especially enlisted and NCOs).**
- √ **Poor information management and battletracking.**
- √ **Poor liaison officer (LO) operations.**
- √ **Lack of organization within the TOC.**

These deficiencies significantly hamper the ability of the TOC to influence the battle by assisting the commander in synchronizing the fight. Doctrine does little to assist units in solving or preventing these problems. A single doctrinal source that consolidates tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for TOC operations does not exist. **FC 71-6, *Battalion and Brigade Command and Control*, Mar 85**, is currently the best source of information. FC 71-6 explains in detail the role and functions of the TOC and personnel who work within the TOC. However, this FC is no longer published and is hard to locate. This newsletter consolidates applicable doctrinal information and also proven TTPs collected by O/Cs from the various CTCs. It is designed to serve as a quick reference guide for newly assigned TOC personnel.



Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

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Section I

TOC SELF-ASSESSMENT

This section provides you a means to assess the effectiveness of your TOC. Most S3s admit that their TOC is not as effective as they would like. When asked why and what they are doing to fix it, the responses are mixed. Before you can fix something, you must first know what is broken. This self-assessment will assist you in identifying your problems, and where to focus your time and effort as you attempt to improve your TOC's effectiveness.

Answer the following questions as objectively as you can. Discuss these questions with all personnel who work in the TOC, including support units.

1. Do you have a current TOC Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)?
2. Do your Radio Telephone Operators (RTOs) know what the mission of the TOC is? Does your TOC SOP address and explain this mission?
3. Can a newly assigned 2LT, SSG, or SPC read your TOC SOP and determine what their duties and responsibilities are in the TOC?
4. How often does your TOC deploy to the field? Do these deployments include slice elements?
5. How often do your RTOs get the hand mike pulled away from them by an officer?

6. Who posts and updates your operations map? Officers, NCOs, or soldiers?

7. During the peak of the battle, are incoming messages occasionally lost or misplaced?

8. Do your RTOs know the meaning of the acronym *CCIR*?

9. Do your NCOs have a detailed understanding of the tactical decisionmaking process (TDMP)? Do they contribute to the TDMP?

10. Who serves as recorders while your staff conducts the wargame process? Officers, NCOs, or soldiers?

11. When responding to requests for information (such as unit locations or activities), does your TOC have to make numerous calls on the radio to get the information before providing an answer?

Answers to these questions can be indicators of how effectively your TOC functions. These questions represent areas where the vast majority of units training at the CTCs experience problems. Do not feel intimidated or combat-ineffective if you have problems in some or all these areas. Many of these areas can be significantly improved in a short amount of time by implementing some very simple TTPs.★



Section II

TOC FUNCTIONS

OBSERVATION: Current doctrinal manuals provide little detail on the specific functions of the TOC.

DISCUSSION: TOCs at the lower echelons of command are typically manned with junior and inexperienced personnel (1LTs waiting to attend the OAC, CPTs waiting on company command, or NCOs and enlisted personnel unfamiliar with staff operations). These relatively junior personnel often have never worked in a TOC and, as a result, are not familiar with the intricate details of TOC operations. Most manuals provide a general overview of TOC functions, but fail to provide detailed guidance to assist newly assigned and inexperienced personnel.

The TOC serves as the unit's command and control hub, assisting the commander in synchronizing operations. The TOC is the location where the majority of the planning, staff coordination, and monitoring of key events occurs. The personnel manning the TOC are responsible for ensuring that all resources are in the right place at the right time. They must function efficiently and effectively as a team in a fast-paced, unforgiving environment. This is no simple task for an inexperienced staff officer or NCO to accomplish. Each member of the TOC must understand the overall function of the TOC, and how they individually and collectively contribute.

There are six basic TOC functions:

1. Receive information.
2. Distribute information.
3. Analyze information.
4. Submit recommendations to the commander.
5. Integrate resources.
6. Synchronize resources.

Each of these functions are critical and interrelated. The order in which these functions occur may vary at times. A more detailed description of each function and their associated tasks are listed below.

Receive Information

- ★ Receive messages, reports, and orders from subordinate units and higher headquarters (HHQ).
- ★ Monitor tactical situation.
- ★ Maintain a journal of all significant activities and reports.
- ★ Maintain and update unit locations and activities.
- ★ Monitor enemy situation.
- ★ Maintain a status of critical classes of supplies.



Distribute Information

- ★ Submit reports to HHQs.
- ★ Serve as a communications relay between units.
- ★ Publish orders and instructions.
- ★ Process and distribute information to appropriate units or staff sections.

Analyze Information

- ★ Consolidate reports.
- ★ Anticipate events and activities, taking appropriate action as required.
- ★ Conduct predictive analysis based on the tactical situation.
- ★ Identify information that relates to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- ★ Conduct the Tactical Decisionmaking Process.
- ★ Identify the need to execute contingency plans based on the current situation.

Recommend

- ★ Submit recommendations to the commander based on information available and analysis conducted.

Integrate Resources

- ★ Coordinate the integration of combat multipliers.

Synchronize Resources

- ★ Coordinate the synchronization of combat multipliers.

These functions and tasks are not easily accomplished, nor can they be effectively accomplished by a single or small group of individuals. Each individual (especially NCOs and enlisted personnel) within the TOC serves a role that ultimately contributes to the accomplishment of these functions. Before personnel can contribute, they must possess a clear understanding of what the TOC's mission is.

Procedures:

1. Incorporate the six basic TOC functions in the TOC SOP.
2. Modify the existing TOC SOP, as required, to incorporate TOC functions.

Techniques:

1. Clearly define what you expect of the TOC. Be specific. Translate expectations into viable procedures.
2. Train TOC personnel to perform their respective tasks in the execution of TOC functions, and to understand how their tasks relate to the other TOC functions.🌀



Section III

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TOC PERSONNEL

This section discusses the duties and responsibilities of personnel who work in the TOC. Whoever in your TOC fulfills each one of these duties is a function of personnel strength, capabilities, and commander preference.

OBSERVATION: Typically at the CTCs, O/Cs observe executive officers (XOs) and battle captains attempting to accomplish many of these tasks with little or no assistance from the NCOs or enlisted personnel.

DISCUSSION: OCs report observing battalion XOs and battle captains talking on the radio, posting maps, and logging entries in journals while NCOs stand by observing. ***MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THIS IS BECAUSE THE OFFICER HAS NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO TRAIN HIS SUBORDINATES, NOT BECAUSE THE NCO IS INCAPABLE.***

This technique often leads to inefficient operations, as well as tired and ineffective leaders. It also prevents the XO or battle captain from doing his job of integrating resources and synchronizing the fight. Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities is the major contributor to this problem. FC 71-6 provides a detailed list of duties and responsibilities for key personnel within the TOC. These duties and responsibilities are highlighted below:

Executive Officer:

The XO's primary responsibility is to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of all staff sections. This responsibility normally requires him to operate from, and supervise all activities within, the TOC. This is especially critical during the battle when synchronization and integration of resources are crucial. During the preparation phase of the mission, these duties can often be fulfilled by the battle captain. However, the battle captain typically lacks the appropriate experience necessary to accomplish these duties during the battle. Other important duties of the XO are:

- ☛ **Supervising and coordinating the staff during the TDMP.**

- ☛ **Supervising the analysis and assessment of all information and submitting recommendations to the commander accordingly.**

- ☛ **Supervising and ensuring proper information flow within the TOC.**

- ☛ **Anticipating and synchronizing operations from the TOC.**



NOTE: The role of the XO is METT-T-dependant. The current situation may prevent the XO from focusing all of his time and effort at the TOC.

Battle Captain:

The role of the battle captain is similar to that of the XO. The battle captain assists the XO in synchronizing and coordinating the staff's effort. The distinction between the two individuals lies in their level of experience. During the battle, synchronizing and coordinating the staff is normally best served by the XO. During the preparation phase, the battle captain can normally fulfill these duties. Experience at the CTCs shows that during the battle, the battle captain should focus his efforts on supervising the soldiers within the S3 operations cell, rather than synchronizing the efforts of other staff members. Additional duties of the battle captain include:

- ☛ **Supervising the efforts of staff NCO's within the S3 section.**
- ☛ **Conducting analysis and assessment of available information.**
- ☛ **Assisting in the review and dissemination of information within the TOC.**
- ☛ **Assisting in monitoring the location and activities of friendly units.**
- ☛ **Serving as the TOC OIC during the absence of field grade officers.**
- ☛ **Assisting the S3 during the TDMP.**

Operations NCO/Shift NCO:

The operations NCO is generally the most underutilized individual in the TOC. The operations NCO seldom works inside the actual TOC. He is typically only responsible for the logistics support, movement, and security of the TOC. These are important tasks, but do not require total commitment of the senior TOC NCO. Doctrinally for some types of units these tasks are the responsibility of the HHC

(page B-4, FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*, Apr 92). The TOC NCO, if trained and utilized properly, can be of much more use to the battalion in the TOC. Duties and responsibilities may include:

- ☛ **Ensuring that reports and messages are distributed properly.**
- ☛ **Updating units statuses on maps and charts.**
- ☛ **Supervising the publication of orders and graphics.**
- ☛ **Supervising the setting up and dismantling of the TOC.**
- ☛ **Supervising all enlisted personnel assigned to the S3 section.**
- ☛ **Managing guard rosters, sleep plans, and shift schedules.**
- ☛ **Assisting in developing and wargaming COAs during the TDMP.**
- ☛ **Serving as a recorder during the TDMP.**

Radio Telephone Operators (RTOs)/Clerk Typist:

The RTOs are another good example of an underutilized soldier. Typically, the RTOs do not talk on the radio. This function is often performed by officers due to a lack of confidence in the RTOs' ability. Once again this lack of confidence often stems from a lack of adequate training and not a lack of capabilities. Duties of the RTOs and other enlisted soldiers can include:

- ☛ **Monitoring the radios.**
- ☛ **Receiving and recording reports.**
- ☛ **Updating status charts as necessary.**
- ☛ **Assisting in the publication of orders and graphics.**
- ☛ **Assisting in the setting up and dismantling of the TOC.**
- ☛ **Serving as recorders during the TDMP.**
- ☛ **Cleaning and preparing charts and overlays for the TDMP.**



This list of personnel and duties is not all encompassing. It is intended to provide a framework for how the duties and responsibilities within the TOC can be delegated. This list

highlights the S3 section, but can be modified, developed, and applied to any section. The matrix below reflects how these duties and responsibilities may look when consolidated.

DUTY POS TOC FUNCTION	XO	BATTLE CPT	OPS NCO/ STAFF NCO	RTO	CLERK/ TYPIST
RECEIVE INFORMATION: MONITOR SITUATION RECEIVE MESSAGES/REPORTS MAINTAIN JOURNAL UPDATE/POST UNIT LOCATIONS UPDATE STATUS BOARDS/CHARTS	X	X	X X X X X	X X X X	X X X X
DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION SUBMIT REPORTS PUBLISH ORDERS PASS MESSAGES/REPORTS WITHIN TOC		X	X X X	X X X	X X X
ANALYZE INFORMATION REVIEW IN/OUT GOING REPORTS/ORDERS CONDUCT PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS IDENTIFY CCIR CONDUCT TDMP SERVE AS RECORDERS DEVELOP TERRAIN SKETCHES PREPARE CHARTS AND OVERLAYS	X X X X	X X X X	X X X X X	X X X X	X X X X
MAKE RECOMMENDATION TO COMMANDER	X	X	X		
INTEGRATE/SYNCHRONIZE RESOURCES	X	X			

TTP: After defining the specific functions of the TOC, determine who will accomplish the specific tasks. As you identify what duty position will accomplish each task, be as specific as possible. Keep in mind the capabilities of assigned personnel. Do not let lack of training or patience from leaders prevent you from utilizing your NCOs and enlisted personnel. If trained and utilized properly, based on the duties and

responsibilities you have identified, these soldiers will make significant contributions to TOC operations. In today's environment where units are operating with significant personnel shortages, delegation of duties and responsibilities is crucial to effective TOC operations.★



Section IV

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

This chapter discusses three aspects of information management that units typically experience problems with during CTC rotations:

- **information display techniques**
- **message handling**
- **battle tracking**

The ability of a TOC to function effectively is largely due to its ability to manage information. This is not a simple task when considering the volumes of message traffic that pass through a battalion or brigade TOC daily. It is very easy for units to experience information overload unless they have simple and effective systems in place to receive and process information.

INFORMATION DISPLAY TECHNIQUES

OBSERVATION: Most units do not have an effective means of displaying information within the TOC to provide commanders and other key personnel a quick update of the unit's status.

DISCUSSION: A commander should be able to sit in front of his map board and get a complete situation report (SITREP) for his unit without asking the shift officer numerous questions. This will only happen if the unit has an effective system in place to visually display critical data.

Effective visual information display techniques have numerous advantages. First, they offer the commander a quick and easy means of getting a snap shot of his unit. Questions to the staff should be the exception rather than the norm. Also, they provide the staff with a quick and efficient means of processing

information. These techniques minimize the passing of message slips between staff sections and making numerous entries in the staff journal.

The use of status boards or charts are normally applied during four phases of an operation. These phases are: planning, battle preparation, execution, and post battle. Identifying the required charts for each phase is difficult and may produce an abundance of charts if not managed carefully. Avoid having too many charts. ***TOO MANY CHARTS IS WORSE THAN TOO FEW CHARTS.*** Not only are they overwhelming inside the TOC, but they require room to transport.

Below is a recommended starting point to assist in identifying what information should be displayed and monitored. Not all of the information or charts listed below are required or recommended.




Planning Phase

- ➔ Specified, implied, and mission-essential tasks.
- ➔ Higher headquarters mission statement and intent.
- ➔ Weather data.
- ➔ Constraints and limitations.
- ➔ Critical facts and assumptions.
- ➔ Time line (include expected enemy events).
- ➔ Restated mission.
- ➔ Task organization.
- ➔ Commander's guidance.
- ➔ COA development sketch.
- ➔ Synchronization matrix.
- ➔ Wargame worksheet.
- ➔ CCIR.
- ➔ COA comparison.
- ➔ Decision support matrix.

Battle Preparation Phase

- ➔ *Offensive Operations:*
 - CL III/V status.
 - Subordinate units order issue and rehearsal status.
 - PCI tracking.
 - Task organization completion status.
 - Maintenance status.
 - Combat power.
 - Status of breach assets and rehearsals.
- ➔ *Defensive Operations:*
 - CL III/IV/V status.
 - Obstacle completion status.
 - Combat power.
 - Survivability status.
 - Engagement area (EA) and repositioning rehearsals.
 - Target reference point (TRP) emplacement.
 - Subordinate units order issue and rehearsal status.

Note: This type of information (Battle Preparation Phase) lends itself to one large chart used to track numerous tasks and subordinate units (See Appendix A for examples).



Execution Phase

- ➡ Combat power.
- ➡ Unit locations and activities.
- ➡ CL III/V status.
- ➡ Enemy contacts, locations, and movements.
- ➡ Enemy BDA.
- ➡ Main aid station and forward aid station locations.
- ➡ Brigade or division assets in your sector (GSR, MPs, etc.)
- ➡ Status of adjacent units.

Post Battle Phase

- ➡ Unit equipment readiness.
- ➡ Unit personnel strength.
- ➡ Resupply status of CL III/V/IX.
- ➡ Unit locations.
- ➡ Consolidations and reorganization status.
- ➡ Maintenance and casualty collection status.

TTP: Units that have and utilize charts tend to manage large amounts of information better than those that do not. Charts alone will not make you successful. You must first identify what critical information must be tracked. A TOC cannot process every piece of information that it receives, especially during the battle. Units must prioritize and train their personnel to distinguish between critical information and routine information. Charts have proved to be useful in handling some types of information. Before developing charts, consider the following:

✓ **Determine what critical information must be tracked and displayed. Avoid information and chart overload.**

✓ **Charts used during the planning process significantly reduce briefing time.**

✓ **Build a box to store and transport charts. This reduces unnecessary wear and**

tear, and also helps maximize use of available cargo space.

✓ **Keep a miniature version of all charts in a notebook for use while moving. This will facilitate maintaining an accurate status during offensive operations or while moving the TOC.**

✓ **Some units use 36"x18" boards; others use 8.5"x11" sheets of paper in document protectors. Both techniques are fine and have proven successful. The only draw back to the small sheets is that they are difficult to read from a distance while conducting a briefing or wargaming session.**

✓ **Use your charts in garrison to discover their value and to train your personnel on their use. Conduct AARs on your tracking systems. Identify what is useful and what needs to be improved.**

✓ **Appendix A contains sample charts.**



MESSAGE-HANDLING TECHNIQUES

OBSERVATION: Units who have established methods and procedures for processing messages and other types of information are more effective than those who do not.

DISCUSSION: Units at the CTCs typically receive, process, and disseminate information rather efficiently during slow-paced operations. Units achieve this success even though they normally do not have established procedures to ensure uniformity and efficiency. However, during fast-paced operations, the end result is significantly different. Typically the unit is so overwhelmed with information during the peak of the battle that it quickly becomes bogged down. Once the TOC is overwhelmed, the first

function to disappear or be degraded is the analysis of the situation by the staff.

Let's first determine what happens as a message is received in the TOC. Before we discuss this, review the basic functions of the TOC. This will assist us in determining what must happen as a message is received. As you recall they are: receive information, distribute information, analyze information, recommend, and integrate/synchronize resources. To assist us in understanding this process, a tactical scenario will be used to explain and identify techniques used to process information.

Tactical Scenario

Time: 1900.

Place: National Training Center.

Mission: Mechanized Battalion Task Force conducts a defense in sector.

Situation: TF Scout platoon screening forward of TF front; TF elements preparing defensive positions and conducting local security patrols.

Time	Event	Action(s) Taken
1905	Scout OP observes suspected enemy dismounted movement vic. boundary between TM B and TM C.	1. Scout Platoon Ldr reports on TF O&I net; requests mortar fire on enemy grid location.
1906	TF S2 RTO receives the report.	1. RTO writes SPOTREP using SALUTE format (on pre-printed form that produces multiple copies);



		<p>keeps one copy and hands other copies to Battle CPT; records msg in S2 journal and passes msg to S2 NCOIC.</p> <p>2. S2 NCOIC plots report and begins analysis of enemy SITEMP previously prepared.</p> <p>3. Battle CPT reads msg; gives copy to S3 shift NOC and TF FSE NCO; plots report on his map.</p>
1911	Battle CPT realizes fire msn located vic boundary between TM B and TM C, within 800m of friendly location.	<p>1. Battle CPT directs FSE NCO to tell Mortar Pldr to be prepared to fire the mission.</p> <p>2. Battle CPT directs S3 Shift NCO to contact Tms B & C to verify their locations for clearance of fires.</p> <p>3. S3 shift NCO logs rpt to journal; posts report on S3 operations overlay, and clears the grid with TMs B & C.</p>
1919	Battle CPT gets confirmation on location for clearance of fires.	<p>1. Battle CPT directs the FSE to notify the mortars to fire the mission and stand by for adjustments from the Scout Pldr.</p>
1927	Analysis by S2 NCOIC, Battle CPT, FSE NCO and TF XO confirms that enemy dismounted patrol location did not conform to his SITEMP.	<p>1. Battle CPT recommends to TF XO that TM B conduct a mounted patrol through the area after the fire mission is complete.</p> <p>2. TF XO directs the S2 to relook the overall enemy situation and report back with his analysis in NLT 30 minutes.</p> <p>cont...</p>



3. XO discusses the situation with the TF commander and recommends TM B conduct the patrol. TF commander concurs.
4. Battle CPT contacts TM B to execute the patrol mission.

This scenario is an example of what might occur in the TOC. Although this example is rather basic, critical actions occurred that involved numerous staff sections and personnel within each staff section.

Here are some of the actions that occurred by TOC function:

Receive Information

- RTOs received report and recorded it on pre-printed message forms.
- RTOs logged message in duty journal.
- Staff sections plot report on map.

Distribute Information

- Battle Captain reviews and distributes report to all applicable sections.

Analyze Information

- Battle Captain reviews and plots report.
- Battle Captain realized that fire mission is vicinity boundary between two units, and identifies need to notify TM B/C for clearance of fires.
- S2, XO, Battle Captain, and other staff officers continue to analyze enemy situation.

Recommends COA


- Battle Captain recommends TF conduct mounted patrol throughout area upon completion of fire mission.

Integrate/Synchronize

- Clears fires with TM B/C.
- Integrates mortar platoon into mission.



The diagram below may help to visualize how the process may occur.



TTP: First identify how specific types of messages and information must be processed within the TOC. Not all information is processed the same. After identifying the different types of messages to be processed, determine who conducts the actions required. (See Section II, TOC Functions, and Section III, Duties and Responsibilities.) Lastly, practice the process. Only repetition will increase the efficiency of processing information within the TOC. As the efficiency of the staff increases while practicing, slowly begin to increase the volume of the traffic. Additionally:

- Use pre-printed message forms that automatically produce multiple copies.
- Keep noise level in the TOC to a minimum. The most effective TOCs are very quiet (even during the battle). RTOs using headsets will help.



BATTLE-TRACKING TECHNIQUES

OBSERVATION: Units who are successful in battle tracking have established systems in place and enforce them.

DISCUSSION: Information display, message handling, and battle-tracking techniques are inseparable. This observation integrates the techniques and procedures discussed previously in the chapter. You cannot effectively track the battle unless you can handle basic message traffic, and have an effective means of displaying or recording information. Most units do well tracking the battle during slow-paced operations. What separates functional TOCs from dysfunctional TOCs is their ability to track the battle effectively during fast-paced operations.

The initial problem that units experience involves identification of what information to track. This area is already discussed in detail in the Information Display Techniques section. This is the most critical step in developing an effective battle-tracking system. There is such a thing as tracking too little/much information. By tracking too much information, a TOC will get bogged down by information of little or no significance. When this occurs, critical messages are often lost in the process.

The next challenge becomes, how does the TOCs process the information once they receive it. Experience shows that TOCs normally receive the right types and amounts of information, but they do not have a system to process it. This system may include the use of charts, overlays, matrices, or some other means of recording or processing the information.

Another problem units have involves information, activities, and locations regarding both friendly and enemy units. Often a report is

received in the TOC that needs to be posted onto a map with additional information that needs to be posted elsewhere (such as a journal or log). This situation creates confusion and often results in loss of critical information. The unit location may get posted on the map, but the description of what the unit is doing often gets lost in a pile of similar SPOTREPs. The “activity” portion of the SPOTREP is often the most critical. This is especially true while attempting to track an attacking enemy. A technique that has worked for some units involves developing unit symbol stickers that can be applied to a map, and also a SPOTREP/activity chart. To explain how this technique is used, we will refer back to our tactical situation.

As you recall from the previous example, the Blue TF is defending against an attacking enemy. The unit has completed its preparation of the defense, and has already made contact with the enemy CRPs. The enemy main body formations have not been observed. Activity within the TOC is slowly approaching its peak. However, an untrained observer would not realize what is going on due to the lack of typical yelling and blaring radios within the TOC. The TF XO and battle captain have complete control of the situation. Radio volumes are relatively low and RTOs are using headsets. Instead of yelling, individuals are walking over to the appropriate individuals and either passing or getting information as required. The XO and battle captain are sitting in front of the operations map. The XO is focused on the big picture, while the battle captain is focused on supervising the activities of only S3 section personnel and assisting the XO when required.



The S3 RTO receives a SPOTREP from the scout platoon leader, now on the battalion command net, who reports observing over 30 enemy combat vehicles moving west to east. The RTO quickly records the information using the pre-printed message form. The XO and battle captain monitor the report and immediately realize the significance of the report. The battle captain takes the remaining copies of the report and passes a copy to the S2 and FSE. The S3 RTO passes his copy of the message to his shift NCO. Normally the shift NCO would log the message in the staff journal, but due to the lack of time, he posts the message on a butcher board positioned between the S3 and S2 map boards (Blue remarks indicate friendly information; Red indicates enemy). The message is then placed in a folder and will be recorded in the journal when time permits after the battle. The S2 pulls an enemy battalion-sized sticker out of his binder where he has stickers premade for the various

types of enemy units he expects to plot. He assigns and places a number on the sticker that corresponds to a number he will annotate on the butcher board. As the situation continues to develop, combat power reports, friendly LOGREPs, and enemy BDA, will be updated on charts and posters positioned throughout the TOC. Journals will not be used until time is available to record the reports. Messages are still logged using the message form, but the messages are now placed in a folder until later. This technique is extremely useful in the defense. Variations of this technique can be developed for offensive operations.

TTP: Tracking a fast-paced operation, such as an attacking motorized rifle regiment (MRR) at the NTC, is difficult at best, but is far from impossible. Implementing some of these recommended techniques may help:



Recommended Techniques:

- ✓ Identify and prioritize critical information to be tracked.
- ✓ Develop a system to track the information determined necessary to track. This system may include charts, matrices, unit symbols, or a butcher board.
- ✓ Develop a system to track both friendly and enemy units. Successful techniques include using color-coded cellophane stickers, color-coded thumb tacks, or color-coded dot-type stickers.
- ✓ Ensure all participants understand and use the system.
- ✓ Ensure everyone plays a role. Do not let two or three personnel attempt to accomplish this themselves while the other 10 people drink coffee.
- ✓ Keep the noise level in the TOC to an absolute minimum. This will contribute significantly to the overall effectiveness of the TOC.
- ✓ Do not let the entering of messages into a journal create a backlog in your information management system at the expense of posting maps, disseminating information, and receiving reports. If time does not facilitate updating your journal as you receive them, keep them in a folder and record them later.
- ✓ Develop standardized map boards so overlays can be easily and quickly transferred from map to map. An inexpensive metal eyelet device is available and can be used to assist with overlays.
- ✓ Consider laying your current operations map on a table instead of hanging it from a tent frame. This technique allows more personnel to gather around and view the map more effectively, instead of looking over someone else's shoulder. ⚡



Section V

LIAISON OFFICER (LO) OPERATIONS

OBSERVATION: Units that habitually exercise and properly resource their Liaison Officers (LOs) are more apt to receive timely and appropriate information from their higher headquarters, resulting in more planning time and a better understanding of how the higher commander sees the battle developing.

DISCUSSION: More often than not, LOs who are observed at the CTCs are newly assigned 2LTs or 1LTs waiting to attend the advanced course. These lieutenants have the best of intentions, but normally lack the experience to make significant contributions to the unit. This

shortfall is not due to lack of effort. When asked what their duties and responsibilities are, the typical response is, “to serve as a courier for orders and graphics.” This is how the majority of LOs are employed. Lieutenants are capable of making more significant contributions than this.

Once again, the problem begins with clearly defining the specific duties and responsibilities of the LO. For the duties and functions of LOs at lower levels (BN and BDE), **FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, May 84**, has the most detailed description. The more critical duties and responsibilities include:

Before Departure from Assigned Unit

- *Clearly understand the mission and duties of the LO.
- *Know the current situation of your assigned unit. This includes, but is not limited to: concept of operations, unit locations, combat power status, and status of critical supplies.
- *Possess current graphics.
- *Obtain information and liaison requirements from each staff section.
- *Obtain and understand the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

Upon Arrival at Supported Headquarters

- *Report to Commander or XO; be prepared to brief unit situation.
- *Establish communications with assigned unit.
- *Visit each staff section and exchange information as required.



During Liaison Tour

- *Keep abreast of the situation of assigned unit and provide updates to supported Headquarters.
- *Monitor and assist in the planning process of supported unit. This includes:
 - ♣Advise staff on how to best employ assets of assigned unit. Especially critical for heavy/light operations.
 - ♣Record all critical information and pass to unit as soon as possible. Include specified/implied tasks, mission-essential tasks, constraints/limitations, etc. This will later assist your unit in conducting its mission analysis.
 - ♣Receive and pass all enemy SITEmps and other intelligence products as soon as possible. This is perhaps the most critical role of the LO during the planning process.
- *Conduct adjacent unit coordination as appropriate.

Upon Return to Assigned Headquarters

- *Immediately brief the Commander, XO, or S3 on information received.
- *Exchange information with appropriate staff sections.
- *Assist unit in conducting the TDMP.
- *Be prepared to respond to additional liaison requirements.

TTPs:

- Take the time to clearly define what you expect of your LO. Use the above list as a starting point. The list you develop may be significantly different based on individual capabilities and unit requirements.
- Once you have defined what you expect of your LO, ensure he clearly understands his duties and responsibilities.
- Don't accept your LO only serving as a courier. He is far more capable and can make significant contributions if provided guidance and direction.
- Identify your LO and begin training him as soon as possible. This process must take place at home station prior to the rotation or real-world mission.
- Provide LO with appropriate equipment, such as radios, vehicles, and GPS.

OBSERVATION: Battalion TFs typically have problems developing a fully integrated and synchronized plan in the relatively short amount of time provided at the CTCs. This may not sound like an issue involving LO operations; however, this is one area where a trained LO can make significant contributions to a unit.

DISCUSSION: From the time of receipt of the brigade order until execution, battalions typically

have less than 24 hours to plan and prepare for the mission. Doctrinally, a unit should publish its order in approximately 8 hours. This is no simple task. What often hinders the planning process at battalion level is the development of the S2's IPB. If a unit uses the doctrinal planning process, the IPB must be at or near completion prior to the mission analysis brief.



Granted, the IPB process is continuous and must be constantly updated, but the initial enemy SITEMPs must be complete. S2s usually do not see any of the brigade intelligence products until the brigade order is issued. As a result, it is difficult for the battalion S2 to develop SITEMPs in a timely fashion. This is where a well-trained LO can be of significant value.

The brigade S2 should have an “initial draft” of his enemy SITEMPs complete well before the brigade order is issued. These SITEMPs are used to develop and analyze friendly COAs. An LO who thoroughly understands the planning process and is playing heads-up ball can immediately get a copy of these and send them to his parent unit. The battalion S2 section may not be able to begin working with them immediately, but at least will have them available so when time does permit, it can use them.

Additionally, as the brigade staff develop and analyze COAs, the LO should be an active participant in the process. He can assist and advise the brigade staff in integrating the capabilities of his unit. This is critical for units who do not habitually work together, such as

during heavy/light operations. As the brigade staff selects and begins to refine a COA, the LO can immediately begin the preliminary mission analysis for the battalion staff. This technique can save significant amounts of time and be of great use to the battalion staff.

TTPs: For the techniques discussed here, the LO must be experienced and possess a thorough understanding of the planning process. These skills are not common to most young lieutenants. This may require the battalion to utilize one of the more experienced battle captains as an LO. One recent brigade S3 was approached with this technique and responded by saying, “I can not afford to give up my best battle captain to serve as an LO.” The brigade commander responded by saying, “I disagree, I can't afford *not* to give up my best battle captain. The role of the LO is too critical.”

→ Ensure your LO thoroughly understands the planning process.

→ Have the LO pass any and all brigade intelligence products as soon as they become available.★



Section VI

TOC LAYOUT

The physical layout of a TOC can have a significant impact on how effective the TOC functions. The layout contributes to how efficiently messages are passed from one staff section to another, and how easily sections communicate with one another. This section describes techniques that have proven useful to units at the CTCs.

OBSERVATION: There is no approved technique on how a TOC should be configured. O/Cs at all the CTCs have seen numerous techniques that work well and others that did not work well. However, most TOCs that functioned effectively had three factors in common. They are:

- *A high degree of organization.
- *Configured in a manner that was functional to the unit and did not segregate staff sections.
- *Planning areas were segregated from TOC briefing and operations areas.

DISCUSSION: The common factors listed above are not surprising or difficult to attain. However, OCs report that finding a TOC that employs all three factors is more difficult than one would imagine.

Organization

Organization is the simplest to correct, but the most difficult to maintain. This entails nothing more than employing the old saying, "A place for everything, and everything in its place." How much time have you seen someone spend searching for the roll of 100-MPH tape, while the S2 is standing there holding an enemy SITEMP

as he begins the mission analysis brief? This problem, or some form of it, has happened to each of us at one time or another. This may sound ridiculous, but if you watched and monitored the amount of time units spent in similar situations, you would probably be surprised.

TTP: ✓Develop packing lists for supply footlockers and field desks. Once developed, use and enforce them.

Functionality

Functionality of the TOC refers to how it is physically configured. A BDM study conducted at JRTC in FY 93 determined that TOC operations were better facilitated when the S2 and FSE were both positioned beside the S3. The study also determined that the synchronization of fires was most effective when the FSE and S2 were beside one another. *Who* is physically positioned *where* in the TOC is determined by the factors of METT-T. In some environments, such as a peace enforcement or disaster relief operations, you may want the civil affairs officer to be positioned beside the S3/S2 instead of the FSE.




The JRTC/BDM study also identified that when the XO or battle captain was centrally located inside the TOC, it was normally more functional. This technique facilitated more efficient message dissemination, integration, and synchronization of resources.

The last point to be discussed involves miscellaneous activities occurring inside the TOC. Often the TOC becomes a place to congregate, eat an MRE, or to get warm during cold weather. There is a time and a place for each of these requirements, but inside the TOC is not the answer. The most effective TOCs are those that ruthlessly enforce these standards.

TTP: ✓ Different environments and conditions may require different TOC configurations. Be flexible, and anticipate these requirements. Some units utilize a red, yellow, and green TOC configuration system. This system is outlined below.

The red TOC configuration is used most during offensive operations. All equipment is stored in vehicles and trailers. The command and control vehicles are then parked in a diamond configuration with the rear bumpers side by side. The operations map is then placed between the vehicles, with ramps or tailgates down. Staff officers then gather around the map to monitor the tactical situation. This technique facilitates rapid movement as necessary.



The yellow TOC configuration is used most during defensive operations when displacement is expected. All equipment is packed with the exception of one tent. This tent contains the current operations map and charts required to track the battle. This configuration can be dismantled and moved in a short amount of time.

The green configuration is the TOC setup in its entirety. This configuration is normally used during the planning process and when rapid displacement is not expected.



☞ When developing your SOPs, consider where elements such as civil affairs, PSYOPS and other nontraditional sections would be positioned. Do not wait until they show up to determine where they will go.

☞ Keep your XO and battle captain centrally located in your TOC.

☞ Keep traffic in and through your TOC to a bare minimum.

☞ Reproduction equipment requires significant amounts of space to store and operate. Some units have dedicated a trailer or 5-ton truck to reproduction equipment and operations. These techniques have proved to be very useful. This will not only save space in the TOC, but also will facilitate more efficient reproduction operations. A dedicated trailer or vehicle with pre-made storage containers prevents unnecessary wear and tear of equipment as well.

☞ For additional ideas on how to set up your TOC, see the following sources:

Chapter 1, FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces*:

Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team, Sep 92

Appendix B, FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*, Apr 92

Planning and Briefing Areas

If your planning is going to be effective, planners must have a work area that minimizes distractions. This area must be separate from the current operations cell and, if possible, from the briefing area. Due to limited resources, it is very difficult for a battalion to establish three separate areas solely dedicated to operations, planning, and briefing. However, most units have resources to establish an area that doubles as a planning and briefing area.

TTP:

✓ Use a separate tent as your plans/briefing area. Some units use the older frame tent as a briefing or planning area.

✓ During periods of good weather, conduct briefings outside when feasible to free space for your planning cell. ⚡



Section VII

HOME-STATION TRAINING

This section provides additional ideas on how to train and implement some of the TTPs previously identified.

1. Depending on how familiar your TOC personnel are with their duties and responsibilities, the planning process, and basic staff operations, you may want to start with a series of classes. Recommended topic areas are:

- ◆ TOC functions.
- ◆ TOC battle drills.
- ◆ TDMP.
- ◆ Communications systems.
- ◆ Review of your TOCSOP.
- ◆ Reports.
- ◆ LO duties.
- ◆ Battle tracking.

As you conduct these classes, they should not be designed as an officer professional development session where only officers attend. These classes should include any and all soldiers who normally work in and around the TOC. This is your opportunity to teach and explain to your junior soldiers what you expect of them. Determine what classes are needed most, and conduct them immediately.

2. Attempt to implement as many of your TOC SOPs as possible in garrison. Staff duties conducted in garrison are not significantly different from those conducted in the field. Use this to your advantage and as an opportunity to train. Recommendations include:

✓ Let your RTOs answer all phone calls. This will help develop their confidence in RTO

procedures. This will also help develop your confidence in their abilities. Some units have gone as far as using tactical communications systems for internal communications.

✓ Develop and post your daily CCIR. This will provide your section the opportunity to process basic information throughout the day. Also, use as many of the same planning and status charts in garrison as you do in the field. (Combat power, CCIR, mission analysis, and timeline.)

✓ When feasible, use your TOC shift-change SOP as an agenda for your daily/weekly meetings.

3. Conduct a TOC exercise (TOCEX) once a month. This can be a very inexpensive training opportunity, but a very valuable one. Use this TOCEX to accomplish the following:

◆ Develop, rehearse, and improve TOC battle drills. Recommended battle drills include TOC displacement, site selection and reconnaissance procedures, TOC security, actions on contact, and shift-change briefs.

◆ Rehearse and improve the TDMP.

◆ Familiarize, test, and validate TTPs you decide to incorporate. If these TTPs don't work, develop new ones.

◆ Determine which TOC setup best suits the units needs.

◆ Include support units as much as possible.



4. Develop a scripted master events list used to conduct a command post exercise. This script could simulate a battle, providing company RTOs the opportunity to submit reports to your TOC. Use these reports as a means to track combat power, unit locations and activities, status of critical supplies, SPOTREPs, etc. Incorporate this into your monthly TOCEX. (See Appendix B.)

5. Force yourself and your immediate subordinates to place more and more responsibility on your junior officers, NCOs, and soldiers on a daily basis. This includes training meetings and staff meetings. You will not always be there to accomplish many of the associated tasks yourself, and it will also assist in developing their skills as a leader.

6. After conducting your training session, reassess your TOC using the initial checklist. Once again, include your TOC personnel in this assessment. If you have made an honest and legitimate effort, you have probably accomplished the following:

- ✓Increased effectiveness of your TOC.
- ✓Provided better synchronization and integration of the combat multipliers.
- ✓Published more effective operations orders in less time.

✓Provided soldiers that are better trained, more involved, and more interested.

7. Ensure all your soldiers are licensed and trained to operate vehicles, generators, and any other critical pieces of equipment.

8. Schedule your NCOs for the Battle Staff Course. Upon graduation, stabilize their assignment in a staff position for as long as possible.

9. Minimize personnel turbulence as much as possible.

10. Integrate your TOC into all unit exercises, to include ranges, gunnery, platoon and company lanes.

11. Develop a TOC training lane. This lane exercise should include TOC displacement drills, actions on contact, moving the TOC during an operation, conducting shift change briefings, and exercising the TAC or jump TOC. This type of training is just as critical as platoon and company-level lane training.


12. Integrate the Retrans element into all training exercises. This will increase the level of training for these soldiers and also increase your confidence in their ability.★



Section VIII

CONCLUSION

Effective TOC operations require frequent training under realistic conditions. Skills that lead to effective TOC operations are perishable and require constant attention. The techniques and procedures outlined in this newsletter are used by various units as part of their standing operating procedures. All are feasible, some can be implemented rather easily, others require more time and training. Many of the techniques and procedures can be incorporated into day-to-day garrison operations. This may seem awkward at first, but will eventually lead to more effective operations in a tactical environment. ★





Appendix A

SAMPLE CHARTS

TF RESTATED MISSION

COMMANDER'S INTENT

AS OF _____



SLANT REPORT


UNIT	TNKS	BFV	PLOW	TOW	DRAG	MORT	SCT	ENG SQD	DOZER	SEE
TM _										
TM _										
TM _										
TM _										
TM _										
TM _										
SCT										
MOR										
AT										
ENG										
ADA										

AS OF _____

INTENT ONE LEVEL UP

INTENT TWO LEVELS UP

AS OF _____



SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

TIME/ EVENT	
ENEMY ACTION	
DECISION POINT	
CCIR	
R/S	
TM ____	
TM ____	
TM ____	
TM ____	
TM ____	
FIRE SUPPORT	
ENG	
ADA	
CSS	
C2	

SPECIFIED TASKS

INTEL

MANEUVER

FIRE SUPPORT

ENGINEER

ADA

CSS

C2

AS OF _____



MANEUVER

ENGINEER

CSS

AS OF _____

SEQ.	ACTION	REACTION	COUNTER ACTION	ASSETS	TIME	REMARKS



FACTS/ASSUMPTIONS

INTEL

MANEUVER

FIRE SUPPORT

ENGINEER

ADA

CSS

C2

AS OF _____



AS OF _____

[illegible]

COA SKETCH

[illegible]

SCHEME OF MANEUVER

TASK/PURPOSE OF SUBORDINATE UNITS

PROPOSED TASK ORGANIZATION



AS OF

[illegible]

AS OF

[illegible]



Appendix B

COMMAND POST EXERCISE

This appendix provides you a simple scenario you can use to conduct an exercise within your unit. This exercise is designed to develop the skills of battle captains, and improve the ability of your TOC to process different types of information. This exercise can be conducted relatively easily with limited resources. Subordinate units can use this exercise as an opportunity to train their RTOs on radio procedures and in submitting reports. Provided is a tactical scenario and master events list. The master events list generates numerous SPOTREPs, call-for-fire missions, and BDA reports. These reports provide your TOC the opportunity to conduct the following: track unit locations, update friendly combat power, friendly unit locations, enemy SPOTREPs, and clear fires. It also provides your battle captains with simple scenarios where basic actions and decisions must be made. Also included is a list of recommended actions. This list provides you the problems that should have been identified during the exercise, and recommended actions your battle captain may have taken. It provides you the ability to assess the effectiveness of how well your TOC did. If this exercise does not meet your unit needs, use this as an example and develop your own. The scenario is generic in nature and can be used by most armor, mechanized infantry, and light infantry units. This scenario portrays a unit conducting a tactical road march at the NTC and facilitates exercising your jump TOC. If you are

not ready to conduct split TOC operations, set up your main CP and conduct this exercise from a static location. As you conduct this exercise, ensure you have someone designated as an O/C. This O/C should not only observe the exercise to provide feedback, but also control and synchronize the exercise to ensure the training objectives are met. The O/C may want to review the script and answer key with all RTOs to ensure they understand the events.

NOTE: Realistically these events may occur over a five-hour timeframe. However, you may not have this much time to commit to the exercise. The exercise can be easily compressed and conducted in much less time. The intent is to provide you with a ready to use tool that will assist in increasing the effectiveness of your TOC.

Background Information:

Your Battalion TF completed a deliberate attack earlier this morning. Subordinate units have spent the last few hours consolidating, reorganizing, and preparing for future operations. From the previous Brigade order, you know that you are to conduct a tactical road march beginning at 1830 and immediately begin preparations for defensive operations. Your scout platoon and quartering party are to SP at 1500 and 1700 respectively.

You are the S3 for TF 1-23.



Task Force 1-23 Task Organization:

TM C Armor

1st plt tank
2d plt tank
3d plt mech

TM D Armor

1st plt tank
2d plt tank
3d plt mech

A Co (AASLT)

B Co (AASLT)

Task Force Control

Mortar Plt
Scout Plt (HMMWV)
TOW Plt (HMMWV)
Field Trains
Combat Trains
TOC
Engineer Plt
ADA Plt
Truck Co(-)

Enemy Situation:

The enemy Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) is expected to attack in the next 36-48 hours. Contact with the enemy during the tactical road march is possible, but not expected. The S2 expects elements of the enemy Division Reconnaissance Battalion to enter into the brigade sector sometime in the next 12 hours.

Friendly Situation:

1st Brigade is conducting a tactical road march along route red and blue. Upon closure into the brigade TAA, the brigade is to begin defensive preparations. The brigade is to be prepared to defend in 36 hours. TF 2-34 is first in the brigade order of march and will move along route red to its TAA. TF 1-23 is second in the order of march and will move along route red, to route blue, to the TAA. TF 2-34 currently has two company teams forward in the

brigade sector conducting counter-reconnaissance operations.

Mission Statement:

TF 1-23 conducts a tactical road march along route red and route blue beginning 151830 Mar 95 to occupy TAA Bulldog (NK433105) and immediately begin defensive preparations.

Concept of Operation:

The task force scout platoon will SP at 1500. It will follow TF 2-34 along route red, and then move along route blue. The scouts are responsible for reconnoitering the TAA. The task force quartering party will be led by the TF CSM and will SP at 1700. The quartering party consists of representatives from each of the subordinate units. See movement table below for other march times. Convoy speed is 20 MPH. Separation times between units is provided. EENT is 1915, and the illumination is extremely poor.



ROUTE RED/BLUE	SP (NJ470986)	CP1 (NK568031) 10K	CP2 (NK583073) 4K	CP3 (NK527114) 8K	RP (NK473122) 6K
SCT PLT	1500				1700
QUARTER PARTY	1700	1724	1734	1753	1807
TM C	1830	1854	1904	1923	1937
TOC	1845	1909	1919	1938	1952
TM D	1900	1924	1934	1953	2007
ENG	1915	1939	1949	2008	2022
MORT PLT(-)	1930	1954	2004	2023	2037
TOW PLT	1945	2009	2019	2038	2052
TM A	2000	2024	2034	2053	2107
TM B	2015	2039	2049	2108	2122
ADA	2030	2054	2104	2123	2137
COMBAT TRNS	2045	2109	2119	2138	2152
FIELD TRNS	2115	2139	2149	2208	2222


Starting Combat Power is as identified below:



UNIT/ EQUIP	TNK	BFV	MINE PLOW	INF SQD	TOW	SCT VEH	4.2 MOR	BSFV	DOZ	SEE
TM C	8	3	3							
TM D	9	4								
TM A				8						
TM B				7						
SCT						7				
MORT							5			
TOW					3					
ADA								4		
ENG									2	2

Master Events List:

<i>Event No.</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>
1	1700	Scout platoon leader reports RP and says he is beginning the reconnaissance of the TF AA.
2	1700	TF CSM reports quartering party SP.
3	1725	TF CSM reports quartering party CP 1.
4	1730	The scout platoon leader reports that he completed his reconnaissance of the TF TAA, and it appears clear of enemy activity.
5	1735	The TF CSM reports CP 2. He also reports that there is no brigade traffic control point (TCP) located at the intersection of Route red and blue as briefed in the movement order. He also states he is concerned this may create problems once it gets dark and that follow-on elements may miss the turn.





17	1920	TM C reports CP3 and that he has re-established contact with his lead platoon and is continuing to move.
18	1925	TM D reports CP1.
19	1930	Mortar platoon reports SP.
20	1935	TM D reports CP2.
21	1940	TM C reports RP and linkup with quartering party.
22	1940	Engineer platoon leader reports that with the heavy equipment in his convoy, he is moving slower than anticipated. He is enroute to CP1 and has lost one of his tractor trailers. He is not sure what happened. He also reports that he has lost visual contact with the trail elements of TM D.
23	1940	TM C commander calls and states he has lost one of his tanks due to maintenance. His mechanics are looking at it now, but they are unable to repair it and will need assistance. He has attempted to contact the BMO on the A/L net, but cannot reach them due to poor communications because of the terrain. Also reports CP 3.
24	1945	Engineer platoon leader reports CP1. Is sending platoon sergeant to look for missing tractor trailer.
25	1945	TOW platoon reports SP.
26	1953	TM D reports CP3.



27	1955	Mortar platoon leader identifies an overturned tractor trailer on the west side of the road vicinity CP 1. The platoon leader's RTO states that the trailer had a dozer loaded on the back of it. He is not sure who the dozer belongs to. He will confirm who it belongs to and notify the TOC. The RTO also states that there were no injuries involved, and the unit has continued its movement.
28	2000	Mortar platoon leader calls back and states the overturned dozer belongs to the engineer platoon attached to your TF.
29	2000	TM A reports SP.
30	2005	Mortar platoon leader reports CP2 and also observes the engineer platoon missing the turn at CP 2.
31	2010	TM D reports RP and linkup with its quartering party.
32	2010	Tow platoon reports CP1.
33	2015	TM B reports SP.
34	2020	Tow platoon reports CP2.
35	2025	Mortar platoon reports CP3.
36	2028	TM A reports CP 1.
37	2030	Engineer platoon leader reports that his platoon sergeant has linked up with the overturned tractor trailer. He confirms no injuries, but states that both the truck, trailer, and dozer have sustained damages and are inoperable. He requests assistance. He also says that he missed the turn at CP2 and is behind a convoy from TF 2-34. He states he knows where he is and will continue to follow TF2-34 and will link up at the RP.
38	2030	ADA platoon leader reports SP.



39	2030	TM C observes an enemy BTR vicinity NK400120. He requests indirect fires on this grid.
40	2037	Mortar platoon reports RP and linkup with quartering party.
41	2038	Tow platoon reports CP3.
42	2040	TM A reports that one of his 5-ton trucks loaded with infantrymen overheated and is unable to complete the tactical road march. He requests an additional truck. The vehicle is located between CP 1 and CP 2. Lead element just reached CP2.
43	2040	TM B reports CP1.
44	2045	S4 reports SP for combat trains.
45	2050	TM B reports CP2.
46	2055	ADA platoon leader reports CP1.
47	2055	Tow platoon leader reports RP and linkup with quartering party.
48	2055	TM A reports CP3.
49	2105	ADA platoon leader reports CP2.
50	2108	TM B reports CP3.
51	2110	TM A reports RP and linkup with quartering party. He requests a status on his downed truck.
52	2110	S4 reports CP1.
53	2115	Field trains report SP.
54	2120	S4 reports CP2.
55	2125	The scout platoon leader reports that OP1 observes two unidentifiable vehicles moving west to east at vicinity NK345080.



56	2130	The ADA platoon leader reports that one of his TCs is injured and needs an air MEDEVAC. The soldier was struck in the head and neck by the TC hatch. The hatch did not have a safety pin. The soldier is complaining of numbness in his lower extremities. He currently has his platoon sergeant and a combat life saver at the scene, but needs a medic. The soldier is located vicinity NK525115.
57	2145	Scout platoon leader reports his OP1 has lost visual contact with two unidentifiable vehicles previously reported.
58	2155	ADA platoon leader reports RP and linkup with quartering party. He also states his platoon sergeant is still at the accident site assisting in the MEDEVAC.
59	2155	Combat trains report RP and linkup with quartering party.
60	2200	Engineer platoon leader report RP and linkup with quartering party.



RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Provided is a list of recommended action that should have been taken by the battle captain/TOC. It will also provide you with an update combat power report upon completion of the tactical roadmarch.

<i>Event No.</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>
5	1735	TF CSM reported no TCP at CP2. Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Tell the CSM to mark the intersection.✓Notify Bde of the problem.✓Give warning order to TM C to be prepared to man TCP as it passes CP2.
6	1745	Plotting of Scout OP3. TOC should have realized the grid was inaccurate as the TOC attempted to plot it. The grid sent by the scout platoon leader is not on the NTC map sheet. Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Clarify location and disseminate correct grid to subordinate units.
9	1830	Mortar vehicle out of fuel. Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact the S4, and tell them to stay on the radio.✓Notify combat trains of vehicle location and situation.✓Conduct radio check with combat trains on A/L net.✓Update combat power chart.✓Notify mortar platoon leader that message was sent, and that should attempt to contact them on the A/L net.
12	1855	TM D task organization not complete. Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact the parent organization of the platoon and get a SITREP.✓Attempt to contact the platoon.
15	1910	Other convoy along same route. Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Notify brigade and TF 2-34.



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| 23 | 1940 | TM C tank with maintenance problems.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Find out from TM C what the maintenance problem is, what is required to fix it, and vehicle location.✓Pass this information to the combat trains. |
| 27 | 1955 | Overturned dozer.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Get exact location of accident.✓Instruct vehicle crew to mark the accident site and to guide passing traffic around the site.✓Notify BMO of problem and need for recovery assets.✓Net call to all units alerting them of accident and dangerous terrain.✓Contact engineer platoon leader, and confirm the vehicle belongs to TF 1-23.✓Notify brigade. |
| 28 | 2000 | Overturned dozer update.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Update combat power chart.✓Notify brigade and request additional dozer support. |
| 30 | 2005 | Engineer unit misses turn at CP2.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact engineer platoon, and verify route/location. |
| 37 | 2030 | Engineer platoon confirms missing turn at CP2.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact TF 2-34 of engineer convoy and intent of platoon leader. |
| 39 | 2030 | Report of enemy BTR and request for fire mission.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓If scout OP location was clarified, do not clear grid, and notify TM C of OP location.✓If scout OP location was not clarified and you approve the mission, a fratricide incident just occurred. |



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| 42 | 2040 | Truck overheated.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Get location of vehicle.✓Ask the commander if he can safely cross-load soldiers onto other trucks.✓Contact BMO, and notify him of truck.✓Contact support platoon leader if another truck is necessary. |
| 55 | 2125 | Scout enemy spot report.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact TF 2-34 and determine if this is a friendly vehicle belonging to them.✓Pass report to brigade.✓Put report out on net call. |
| 56 | 2130 | ADA platoon MEDEVAC.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Contact units already in TAA and coordinate to get medic on site ASAP.✓Initiate request for air MEDEVAC.✓Find out how the MEDEVAC PZ will be marked, and pass this info to the MEDEVAC aircraft.✓Tell the ADA platoon leader to mark the site, and provide guides to mark detour around accident site. |
| 57 | 2145 | Scout spot report/lost visual on two vehicles.
Recommended action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓Pass information to brigade and subordinate units. |

Additional issues that should have been identified:

- ☛Field trains only called in their SP, failing to call in any other CPs.
- ☛TM B did not report RP and linkup with quartering party.
- ☛Net call to all units.



UNIT/ EQUIP	TNK	BFV	MINE PLOW	INF SQD	TOW	SCT VEH	4.2 MOR	BSFV	DOZ	SEE
TM C	7	3	3							
TM D	9	4								
TM A				8						
TM B				7						
SCT						7				
MORT							4			
TOW					3					
ADA								4		
ENG									1	2

Update Combat Power Report